Manipur in frying pan—A Question of Control or Trust?

The escalating tension in Manipur, particularly in Imphal West and Imphal East, has led to curfews following student protests and Meira Paibi demonstrations. The agitators are demanding the abrogation of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with Kuki militants and the transfer of Unified Command control to the state government. The belief driving these demands is that the ongoing militant attacks and loss of innocent lives can be better addressed by the state’s Chief Minister rather than the central government. This raises critical questions about governance, security, and the delicate balance of power between the Centre and state.
A key element of the unrest is the growing mistrust of central security forces, particularly in the hill areas, where Kuki militants have been committing acts of terror towards valley people. The perceived inaction of these forces has shaken public confidence, as civilians—women and elders included—continue to fall victim to violence. Protesters believe that handing control over to the Chief Minister would result in more decisive action, given the state’s proximity to the crisis. However, whether this shift in command would truly resolve the situation remains uncertain.
Politically, this is no simple issue. While both the central and state governments are led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), their approaches to handling the militancy and ethnic tensions seem misaligned. The central government has historically kept a tight grip on security operations in conflict-prone regions like Manipur, citing national security concerns. Transferring Unified Command control to the state might give the impression of local autonomy but could complicate broader security strategies in the Northeast.
The argument for state control rests on the idea that local leaders, better attuned to regional dynamics, can manage crises more effectively. Chief Minister N. Biren Singh, with his deep understanding of the Meitei-Kuki tensions, might address the conflict’s ethnic aspects more sensitively. However, this does not ensure militants will lay down arms, nor does it mean the state has the capacity to combat insurgency without the Centre’s resources and support.
Adding to the complexity is the demand to abrogate the SoO agreement with Kuki militants. Designed to provide temporary relief from violence, the agreement is now viewed as a tool that has allowed militants to regroup and rearm. While center consider abrogating it could hamper its security larger context, continuing the agreement has also failed to prevent attacks on civilians. This dilemma places the state and central governments in a bind: action in either direction comes with significant risks.
A larger issue looms: the relationship between the central and state governments in managing this crisis. Even if the Unified Command were to be handed over to the state, it is unlikely the central government would relinquish full control over such a sensitive issue. Manipur’s crisis, while deeply local, is part of a broader national security concern, particularly given its proximity to Myanmar and the potential for foreign influence.
The solution to the crisis demands more than a simple change in command. It requires a coordinated effort from both the central and state governments. The central government must address the legitimate grievances of the people, restoring trust through transparency and action. The state government, in turn, must assert its authority in a way that reassures its citizens without alienating the Centre.
Only through such cooperation can the ongoing crisis in Manipur move toward resolution. A transfer of control alone will not suffice. What is needed is a commitment to addressing the root causes of the conflict—ethnic divisions, insurgency, and the erosion of trust in governance. This, more than anything, will determine whether peace can finally be restored to the troubled state.