By: Ajit Kumar Singh
At the time of writing. Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK) is on boil. Once again, serious unrest has had with authorities launching a widespread crackdown on protesters and opposition leaders, with sharp. accusations of the government’s use of excessive force. Internet services have been suspended across much of the territory, effectively isolating the region, while the administration has reportedly sought up to 14,000 additional personnel from the Federal Government.
The deteriorating situation has prompted local authorities to discourage tourism between June 5 and June 20. The United States Embassy in Islamabad has also advised its citizens in POJK to exercise caution.
The latest violence erupted on June 7, 2026, when clashes between Security Forces (SFS) and supporters of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) left at least 12 people dead, including eight civilians and four police personnel. At least 73 others – 23 SF personnel and 50 civilians were injured.
Authorities claim that a violent mob attacked a hospital following a ruling by the Supreme Court of PoJK that upheld the constitutional status of 12 legislative seats reserved for refugees from the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) residing in Pakistan. According to official accounts, four police officers and a passerby were killed before SFS responded, after which six protesters were killed.
Protesters, however, argue that the violence began when JAAC supporters gathered outside a hospital morgue where the body of activist ShahzaibHabib, allegedly shot dead earlier by SFs, had been taken. They maintain that demonstrators were subsequently targeted by SF personnel.
The current unrest follows similar protests in September and October 2025 that left more than 10 people dead and over 100 injured. Those disturbances, eventually, led to the signing of the Muzaffarabad Agreement, also known as the October 4 Accord, between the Federal Government, the PoJK administration, and JAAC representatives.
The agreement covered compensation, governance reforms, economic relief measures, and political commitments. Families of those killed during the 2025 protests were promised compensation equivalent to that provided to law enforcement personnel, while those injured by gunfire were to receive PKR 1 million. Government jobs for families of the deceased, judicial inquiries into major incidents, and action against those involved in violence were also included. Economic measures envisaged PKR 10 billion for electricity infrastructure, continuation of wheat and electricity subsidies, and tax reforms. The Accord also proposed improvements in healthcare, education, infrastructure, and the creation of a committee to examine the status of the 12 refugee seats.
Although authorities later claimed that 36 of JAAC’s 38 demands had been accepted, the organisation rejected those assertions and, on May 31, 2026, announced an indefinite strike beginning June 9, 2026.
Meanwhile, tensions escalated when, on June 5, the government banned JAAC, citing concerns over public order and security. Several members were subsequently arrested.
At the centre of the present agitation is JAAC’s demand for the abolition of 12 seats in the 53-member Legislative Assembly reserved for refugees from J&K who settled in Pakistan after 1947 and 1965. JAAC argues that these seats allow mainstream Pakistani political parties to influence government formation in POJK and dilute local political representation. For many protesters, the issue has become synonymous with demands for greater autonomy and local control.
The controversy gained further significance after the Supreme Court ruled that the reserved seats are constitutionally protected and cannot be abolished without a constitutional amendment. The ruling effectively closed one avenue for resolving the dispute and contributed to the current escalation.
The present movement marks a significant shift in the character of public mobilisation in POJK. JAAC initially emerged as a platform focused on economic grievances, particularly rising electricity tariffs, inflation, and governance failures. While economic concerns initially drove these movements, the latest agitation has increasingly centred on political representation and Islamabad’s influence over regional affairs.
These grievances are rooted in longstanding structural issues. Since Pakistan took control of the territory in 1947, POJK has periodically witnessed protests over autonomy, governance, resource allocation, and constitutional rights. Despite being projected as “Azad” (Free) Kashmir, many residents argue that political and administrative decision-making remains heavily controlled by Islamabad.
The recurrence of protests reflects unresolved political and economic challenges. High unemployment, inadequate public services, energy shortages, and perceptions of political marginalisation continue to fuel public dissatisfaction. While previous movements resulted in partial concessions, none has fundamentally altered the governance framework that many protesters view as the source of their grievances.
The situation is likely to remain tense ahead of Legislative Assembly elections scheduled for July 27, 2026. JAAC has indicated that it intends to continue its campaign despite the ban, while authorities appear determined to prevent large-scale mobilisation.
International reaction has so far been limited but notable. A group of British parliamentarians has raised concerns regarding the crackdown, arrests of activists, and communications restrictions. Islamabad has dismissed the criticism as interference in its internal affairs.
The latest unrest highlights persistent governance failures in PoJK and draws renewed attention to unresolved political contradictions that have existed for decades. Increasingly, public demands are centred on political accountability, representation, and local control. Unless these issues are addressed through meaningful reforms, the cycle of protest and state repression is likely to continue.
(The author is Senior Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management)
