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Hybrid Threats, Grey Zones, Competition, and Proxies: When Is It Actually War?

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Hybrid Threats, Grey Zones, Competition, and Proxies: When Is It Actually War?

By – MC Meetei
In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, terms such as ‘hybrid threats’, ‘grey zones’, ‘competition’, and ‘proxy warfare’ have taken centre stage in discussions surrounding global security and undermining genuine struggles for self-determination. These concepts have redefined the dynamics of conflict, often blurring the lines between war and peace. From cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure to covert operations conducted by non-state actors, these phenomena challenge traditional legal frameworks and raise critical questions: When do such actions constitute an act of war? How should the international community respond?
Defining the Terminology
Hybrid Threats: This term refers to a combination of military and non-military, kinetic and non-kinetic tactics used by state or non-state actors to destabilise adversaries. Examples include cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and the use of proxies to achieve strategic objectives. The hallmark of hybrid threats lies in their ambiguity, often designed to evade attribution and accountability.
Grey Zones: These are spaces where actions occur below the threshold of conventional armed conflict, exploiting the gaps in legal and political frameworks. Grey zones are characterised by uncertainty, where state or non-state actors engage in activities that do not clearly violate international law but challenge the norms of state sovereignty and continuing armed conflicts.
Competition: In this context, competition encompasses geopolitical, economic, and military rivalries that stop short of open conflict. While competition is a natural aspect of international relations, its manifestation through coercive and hybrid measures raises concerns about stability.
Proxy Warfare: This refers to conflicts where state or non-state actors support other parties to achieve their strategic goals indirectly. Proxies can range from armed groups and militias to cyber mercenaries. The use of proxies allows states to exert influence while maintaining plausible deniability.
Legal Frameworks and Challenges
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) emphasises that the classification of a situation as an armed conflict—and thus subject to international humanitarian law (IHL)—depends on objective criteria, not political narratives. Under IHL, armed conflicts are classified as either international (between states) or non-international (between a state and non-state actors or among non-state actors). The determination hinges on factors such as the intensity of hostilities and the organisation of the parties involved.
Global Examples of Hybrid Threats
1. Cyber Operations: In 2024, a series of cyberattacks targeted critical infrastructure in Europe, disrupting power grids and financial systems. While these acts caused significant damage, they fell into the grey zone, as they did not meet the intensity threshold to qualify as armed conflict under IHL.
2. Election Interference: Allegations of foreign meddling in elections, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks, have become common. While these actions undermine democratic institutions, they often remain outside the purview of IHL unless they occur in the context of an ongoing armed conflict.
3. Proxy Wars: The conflict in Yemen illustrates the complexity of proxy warfare. With multiple states providing financial and military support to different factions, the situation highlights the difficulty of attributing responsibility and ensuring accountability.
The Manipur Context and the Assam Scenario
The northeastern Indian annexed state of Manipur has experienced decades of unrest, marked by the presence of non-state armed groups and allegations of foreign support. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) has been a contentious issue, granting sweeping powers to the military. While the situation in Manipur does not seem to meet the criteria for an international armed conflict, the dynamics of proxy support and hybrid tactics highlight the challenges of addressing such issues within the existing legal framework.
For instance, reports of cyber operations and disinformation campaigns aimed at worsening ethnic tensions in Manipur suggest the presence of hybrid threats. In addition, the involvement of external actors in supporting insurgent groups complicates the situation, necessitating a nuanced approach to conflict resolution and law enforcement.
In East West Centre’s, “InsurgenciesinIndia’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change”, Subir Bhaumik writes, ‘Faced with the growing strength of Meitei insurgent groups, who refused to engage in political negotiations and demanded a plebiscite, the Indian government, for the first time, authorised the army in 2005 to sign a Suspension of Operations (SOO) agreement with eight Kuki and Zomi tribal insurgent groups active in southern Manipur. These groups were subsequently utilised by the Indian army in its efforts to counter Meitei insurgents in Kuki-Zomi-dominated districts such as Churachandpur’.
In response, Meitei insurgent groups like the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) reacted aggressively. Allegations surfaced in 2006 accusing UNLF guerrillas of committing atrocities, including the rape of Kuki women, tarnishing the group’s moral high ground. This further escalated ethnic tensions, leading Kuki organisations to openly demand the deployment of additional Indian military units in their areas for protection against the UNLF.
The exploitation of ethnic divisions by the Indian army and intelligence agencies was not unique to Manipur. However, the use of Kuki groups against the UNLF stands out as one of the most overt examples of such a strategy. The UNLF has alleged that the Indian army employed guerrillas from the Kuki National Army as “scouts” to track down their bases, intensifying the already volatile situation.
The present situation in Manipur of using mercenaries in the aftermath of May 3, 2023 corroborates the claims of Subir Bhaumik in East-West Center Washington Working Papers No.10, July 2007.
In the similar fashion, Subir Bhaumik further maintains that the imposition of President’s Rule in Assam in 1990, followed by intensive military operations, set the stage for significant political and insurgent developments. When the Congress returned to power in 1991, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) struck back with a dramatic show of defiance, kidnapping fourteen senior officials in a single day. Among the hostages, Soviet coal engineer Sergei Gritchenko was killed while attempting to escape, and petroleum engineer T. Raju lost his life in crossfire during a police raid on an ULFA hideout.
Assam’s Chief Minister, Hiteswar Saikia, managed to negotiate the release of the kidnapped officials without fully conceding to the ULFA’s demands. Demonstrating shrewd political acumen, Saikia then systematically set about dismantling the rebel organisation. His strategy included exploiting internal divisions within the ULFA, a tactic carried out with ruthless efficiency. The Assam police leveraged surrendered militants—popularly known as SULFA (Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam)—to track and eliminate their former comrades in the underground movement.
Similar to the role of the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN) in Nagaland, SULFA became an indispensable tool for the Indian security apparatus, albeit without evolving into a political platform. SULFA provided critical intelligence on ULFA operations, participated in cross-border incursions into Bhutan to attack ULFA bases, and was implicated in targeted killings of ULFA relatives and sympathisers. One such tragic victim was Parag Kumar Das, a prominent editor who had emerged as an ideologue of the ULFA’s cause.
The state’s collaboration with SULFA extended beyond intelligence and combat operations. The group’s members were funded through “secret source funds” of the army and intelligence agencies, and its leaders were rewarded with lucrative business opportunities, such as control over the coal trade along the Assam-Meghalaya border. Over time, many SULFA leaders amassed immense wealth, rising to prominence as part of Assam’s new class of billionaires.
The state’s calculated exploitation of SULFA not only eroded ULFA’s operational strength but also reshaped Assam’s socio-economic and political landscape, creating a complex legacy of insurgency, statecraft, and economic disparity.
When Is It Actually War?
Determining whether a situation constitutes an armed conflict under IHL requires an objective assessment of facts on the ground. For international armed conflicts, any use of force between states qualifies, regardless of its scale or duration. In contrast, non-international armed conflicts require a certain level of intensity and organisation among the parties involved.
The ambiguity of hybrid threats and grey zones complicates this assessment. For example, cyberattacks targeting civilian infrastructure during peacetime may not trigger the applicability of IHL but could amount to violations of peacetime norms under international law. Similarly, the use of proxies raises questions about the degree of control exercised by the sponsoring state, which is crucial for determining legal responsibility.
Implications for International Law and Policy
The rise of hybrid threats and grey zones necessitates a re-examination of existing legal frameworks. Key considerations include:
1. Attribution: Establishing responsibility for hybrid attacks is challenging, particularly when actors operate covertly. Strengthening mechanisms for attribution is essential to ensure accountability.
2. Thresholds for Armed Conflict: The international community must consider whether the existing thresholds for classifying armed conflict are adequate in the face of new threats. For instance, should cyberattacks causing significant harm be treated as acts of war?
3. Regulation of Proxies: The use of proxies complicates the application of IHL. Developing clearer guidelines on state responsibility for the actions of proxies is crucial.
A Call for Multilateral Cooperation
Addressing hybrid threats and grey zones requires a coordinated international response. Key measures include:
· Enhancing Cybersecurity: States must invest in strong cybersecurity infrastructure and cooperate to combat cyber threats.
· Strengthening Norms: Developing international norms to regulate hybrid threats, such as prohibitions on cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, is vital.
· Promoting Transparency: Increasing transparency in state actions can help build trust and reduce the risks of miscalculation.
Conclusion
Hybrid threats, grey zones, competition, and proxies represent the evolving face of conflict in the 21st century. While these phenomena challenge traditional notions of war, they underline the enduring relevance of international law. By adapting legal frameworks and fostering multilateral cooperation, the international community can navigate these challenges and uphold the principles of peace and security. The experiences of Manipur and other regions around the globe highlight the need for a delicate approach, balancing security imperatives with respect for human rights, the rule of law and the international humanitarian law.

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