N. Biren Singh has already resigned, why no peace process

The demand for peace in Manipur has long been entangled with political maneuvering, armed struggles, and governmental directives. One of the major conditions set forth for initiating the peace process was the removal of N. Biren Singh as Chief Minister. The Kuki groups, among the primary parties to the ongoing conflict, had asserted that a peace dialogue could only begin once he was out of office. Now that Biren Singh no longer holds the chief ministerial post, the logical expectation was that negotiations for peace would commence. Yet, no such process has been set in motion. Instead, the government has issued an order directing all armed groups to surrender their weapons. This raises a fundamental question: If the demand for Biren Singh’s removal was indeed a prerequisite for peace talks, then why has there been no movement towards initiating them? And why is the focus now primarily on disarmament rather than reconciliation?
The assumption that disarmament should precede the peace process is deeply flawed. Historically, conflicts across the world have shown that voluntary surrender of arms is more successful when embedded within a structured peace process. In Manipur’s case, the order to surrender arms without any concrete peace initiative is bound to be met with skepticism. Many of the armed groups, particularly those claiming to be defending their communities, will view this as an attempt to weaken them without addressing their core grievances. On the contrary, had a genuine peace dialogue been initiated alongside such an order, there would have been a higher likelihood of voluntary compliance.
The absence of a peace process points to deeper issues of trust and intent. The demand for Biren Singh’s removal was predicated on the belief that his presence in office was an obstacle to negotiations. If his resignation has not resulted in talks, then it suggests that either the demand was superficial or that the government never intended to negotiate in good faith. This only fuels the perception that the state’s response to the crisis is more about control than resolution. It also reinforces the view that armed groups are being targeted with unilateral disarmament while the root causes of the conflict remain unaddressed.
One must also consider the implications of issuing a surrender order without concurrent confidence-building measures. Armed groups have been active in Manipur due to longstanding grievances, including historical injustices, ethnic tensions, and perceived governmental bias. To expect them to lay down arms simply because an order has been issued is unrealistic. Without providing security assurances, addressing political concerns, and engaging in meaningful dialogue, the state risks pushing these groups further into clandestine resistance rather than drawing them into a framework for peace.
The government’s current approach also has the potential to further alienate communities. The ongoing ethnic conflict has already divided Manipur along communal lines, and any action perceived as disproportionately targeting one side will only deepen suspicions. If the state is serious about peace, then it must go beyond issuing unilateral orders and instead create a participatory and transparent mechanism for disarmament and reconciliation. This requires not just demands for surrender, but assurances of security, inclusivity, and justice for all parties involved.
Another pressing issue is the role of the central government in facilitating the peace process. The Union government has a significant influence over the security apparatus in Manipur, and its stance on resolving the conflict will ultimately shape the outcomes. If New Delhi remains indifferent or continues to rely solely on military-driven policies, then the situation is unlikely to change. The government must recognize that sustainable peace can only be achieved through dialogue and political solutions, not just through administrative directives.
Ultimately, the failure to initiate a peace process despite fulfilling a key demand—the removal of Biren Singh—exposes the contradictions within both the government and the armed groups. If the removal of a chief minister was genuinely seen as a step towards peace, then there must be accountability from those who made this demand. At the same time, the government must explain why it is hesitant to engage in negotiations while simultaneously pushing for disarmament. This lack of clarity only exacerbates the existing trust deficit.