

Editorial

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Making a New India and fate of Manipur

Recently, the government of India revoked Article 370, resulting in Jammu and Kashmir losing its special status of autonomous internal administration. With the scrapping of this Article came a plethora of hue and cry over Government of India forcefully seizing the power to govern Jammu and Kashmir in addition to the fear established in the state about its demographic transformation.

A state that is now Muslim majority can turn into one with Hindu majority, given the fact that anyone from other parts of India can now buy land and settle in Jammu and Kashmir. The buying and settling are not coming with peace and prosperity, instead it is going to bring settler colonialism. In fact, scrapping Article 370 has opened the gateway to Jammu and Kashmir for Indian (Hindu) settler colonialism. Settler colonialism functions in a way of erasing and replacing the indigenous population by constantly pouring in of a settler society.

Such invasion does not have a specific date or time. It functions as a structure and not as an event. Unlike other forms of colonialism where one can see the visible violence and recognize it, settler colonialism acts like a slow poison right under one's nose. One does not see the result immediately, but by the time the indigenous people realizes, the erasure and replacement of the indigenous population must have gone way too far. Unlike exploitation colonialism, settler colonialism does not prioritize on profiting off of resources or exploitation of labour. Settlers come to stay and grab the land, followed by slowly controlling the socio-economic and political situation, which eventually results in profiting off of the resources and exploitation of labour.

In case of Jammu and Kashmir, it is possible that most Hindus will start settling and buying lands, gradually taking over the economic control and social structure of the then-state-now-UT, Jammu and Kashmir. Such a situation must sound familiar to the people of Manipur. The people of Manipur have been witnessing the invasion of mayang settlers over the years, who have been buying lands and properties as well as gradually taking over the economic control. The fear of getting erased and losing ourselves to the mayang settlers have also ignited the fire of resistance amongst the indigenous population as well. Look at Thangal Bazaar and the non-indigenous population of 7% in Manipur by 2011, for instance. Apart from this, the growing mayang settler population has even paved a way for one of them to be elected as an MLA from Jiribam. With settler colonialism, the mayang representatives in Manipur state assembly might increase as its population influx grows, to the extent that they might takeover the state governance. All of these is the reason Manipur resisted aggressively against the Citizenship Amendment Bill. The settler colonialism has already initiated way back, but the bill is going to accelerate the process of settler colonialism as CAB allows the mayang settlers from outside India to gain citizenship in just 6 years compared to what was 11 years earlier. Sooner they become citizens, higher is the chance of them buying and occupying lands and resources.

Finally, resulting in them taking over the land - the most important aspect of settler colonialism. On the other hand, before the announcement of abrogation of Article 370, GOI created an environment of fear and chaos by announcing a false alarm of terror attack, in order to impose a military control by sending troops in addition to the existing troops, followed by cutting off all forms of communication (cellular and internet). The decision clearly showed that the GOI was aware that the people will strongly resist, given the history of resistance in Jammu and Kashmir against Indian occupation.

It was just a ploy to suppress the resisting voices and silence them into submission. Similarly, GOI can act in such a way to impose CAB by creating some kind of fear and chaos, given the history of resistance by the people of Manipur, especially the aggressive resistance against CAB last time. Shutting off internet in such a time, is not new as well. The false alarm set before the sudden announcement of abrogation of Article 370 can happen at the time of passing the CAB, since the BJP is in absolute majority this time and considering it was in their manifesto as well. At least, the opposition had a good number to reject the Bill last time, but it is a clear sweep this time. In order to contain and suppress the resisting voices of the people of Manipur, the GOI alongwith the Manipur government might cook up something. Just like the abrogation of Article 370 opens the gateway for settler colonialism in Jammu and Kashmir, the CAB helps India and its mayang settlers to gain momentum in the existing settler colonialism in Manipur.

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From Kashmir and 370 to Partition, BJP's Hatred of Nehru is Fuelled by Falsehoods

Courtesy The Wire  
By : A.G. Noorani

The Sangh *parivar's* hatred of Jawaharlal Nehru is perfectly understandable. At the time of the Partition of India, he stood by Gandhi and bravely fought back the rising surge of hate fostered by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS supreme, M.S. Golwalkar's plans to exterminate Muslims were detected, as the chief secretary of Uttar Pradesh, Rajeshwar Dayal revealed in his memoir *A Life in Our Time*.

Had he been arrested, as Dayal suggested, Gandhi's life would have been spared. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the RSS still feel very uneasy about Gandhi. L.K. Advani got installed in the hall of parliament the portrait of V.D. Savarkar - whom a judge of the Supreme Court, Justice J.L. Kapur, held guilty of being a member of the conspiracy to kill Gandhi. Savarkar is author of the *parivar's* Bible, *Hindutva*. Gandhi's portrait there faces that of his assassin.

This writer gauged the depth of the BJP's hatred of Nehru in 1989 when he met Jaswant Singh, a friend some of us thought was a liberal. He asked me for the word in Urdu for an idol breaker. It is *bushikan*. He proceeded to tell me, for the first time, that we must demolish three "idols" - planning and non-alignment. He did not mention the third. It was, obviously, secularism. In Mumbai he lamented before a gathering of businessmen that in India, three Gs are treated with scorn - Gai, Ganga and Gita. He had never stated this falsehood before.

Hatred of Nehru has been fuelled by falsehoods of history. But the truth was never a parivar virtue. To cite an instance, Advani brazenly contradicts himself on the Jan Sangh's transformation into the BJP in one and the same book, *My Country, My Life* (2008). At page 38, he writes that the Jan Sangh "later became the Bharatiya Janata Party" in 1980. But at page 311, he writes: "while affirming our proud link with both the Bharatiya Jan Sangh and the Janata Party, connoted that we were now a new party with a new 'identity'" (emphasis added throughout).

This is a brazen falsehood. The BJP soon developed an item in its credo, "Gandhian Socialism". A.B. Vajpayee spoke the truth: "When did we leave the Jan Sangh?"

This earned it the wrath of the RSS, which wanted revival of the Jan Sangh. Vajpayee and Advani knew that the Sangh's name was mud in the country. It needed the destructive slogan of Ayodhya - which Rajiv Gandhi generously provided it in 1986 - for the BJP to rise from two seats in the Lok Sabha in 1984 to 89 in 1989. If these people could utter lies on a matter like this, one should not expect anything better on Nehru's record. If Kashmir is a part of India, it is almost entirely because of Nehru. He had the foresight to forge an understanding with its tallest leader, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in the 1930s. As far back as in May 1947, he wrote a detailed memorandum to the Viceroy Mountbatten staking a claim to Jammu and Kashmir ahead of the Partition. The BJP's ancestor, the Jan Sangh, was interested only in Jammu and its proxy, the Praja Parishad. On January 1, 1952, Nehru uttered a bitter truth which still rankles in the minds of the BJP. Its behaviour in recent months has vindicated Nehru. He said:

"You can see that there can be no greater vindication than this of our secular policies, our Constitution, that we have drawn the people of Kashmir towards us. But just imagine what would have happened in Kashmir if the Jan Sangh or any other communal party had been at the helm of affairs. The people of Kashmir say that they are fed up with this communalism. Why should they live in a country

where the Jan Sangh and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh are constantly beleaguering them? They will go elsewhere and they will not stay with us." (S. Gopal [Ed.] *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol.17, p.78).

Patel was also privy to the pledge on plebiscite as, indeed, was his cabinet colleague Shyama Prasad Mukherjee. One does not expect the historical truth from man like a Narendra Modi and his man Friday Amit Shah. They are not only uneducated but uneducable. What Shah, now Union home minister, said in his speech in the Lok Sabha on June 28 deserves note because it recites all the BJP's main charges against Nehru. No cabinet minister is able to open his mouth on any subject without praising Modi to the skies. How long this political obscenity lasts remains to be seen.

**The Partition**  
Let us begin with this first charge. The entire Congress, Patel included, was privy to it. The Congress of 2019 is not the Congress of 1947 or 1944. The formula which Gandhi offered to Jinnah in 1944 envisaged the Partition of India after a plebiscite of "contiguous Muslim majority districts".

But the greatest splitter was Mukherjee, the Jan Sangh's founder: He was a collaborator with the British, teaching the governor how to defeat the Quit India movement. Jinnah could not have spent three hours talking to him unless Partition was a topic. The Cabinet Mission's Plan of May 16, 1946, was the last chance of preserving India's unity. It envisaged a united federal India. Jinnah accepted it, the Congress did not. Mukherjee hated it, he wanted Partition. This is what he wrote to Patel on May 11, 1947:

"I hope there is no possibility of the Muslim League accepting the Cabinet Mission Scheme at the last stage. If Mr. Jinnah is compelled to do so by the force of events, please do not allow the question of partition of Bengal to be dished. Even if a loose Centre as contemplated under the Cabinet Mission Scheme is established, we shall have no safety whatsoever in Bengal. We demand the creation of two provinces out of the present boundaries of Bengal - Pakistan or no Pakistan." (Durga Das [Ed.]; *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 4, p. 40).

Thus, even if there was no Partition, Bengal must be partitioned on religious lines. Its impact on the nature of the federation and of the affected provinces, East Bengal, Sind, Punjab, N.W.F.P. and Balochistan can well be imagined.

There always existed a section of the Hindu politicians which preferred Partition. Lipat Rai said as much in 1924. Lipat Rai joined a cabinet in 1947 whose leaders had accepted the Partition of India? He did so with the same ease with which he had joined Fazlul Haq's cabinet in Bengal. He wanted J&K also to be partitioned on communal basis. He was a partitionist to the core.

Yet Amit Shah said: "Who has done the Partition? We did not do that. Who gave consent for Partition? Today also we tell that, the nation should not be divided based on the religion. It was a historical mistake. Its height is like Himalayas and depth is like ocean. But we did not do that mistake. Mistake was done by you, your party has done and you can't run from that history."

**The ceasefire in Kashmir**  
Amit Shah said: "Jawaharlal Nehru was the prime minister who called for a ceasefire. That part is now in Pakistan. You are teaching us history, making allegations, and doing press conference, we will not take this and that into confidence. Without taking into confidence the home minister and deputy prime minister of the nation, Jawaharlal Nehru has taken the decision; if [others were] taken into confidence, today the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir would have been

in India's possession." This is utterly and totally false. Volume 1 of Patel's correspondence belies the charge that Patel was not taken into confidence. In that event, he was man enough to resign from the cabinet. The record was set out in full by a professional military historian, S.N. Prasad, based on interviews and official records. He was director, historical section of the Ministry of Defence. *History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48)* was published in 1987 by the history section of the defence ministry. The history's analysis is set out here in *extenso*.

"The enemy had in December 1948 two infantry divisions of the regular Pakistan Army, and one infantry division of the so-called 'Azad Kashmir Army' fighting in the theatre. These comprised fourteen infantry brigades, or 23 infantry battalions of the Pakistan Army and 40 infantry battalions of "Azad Kashmir", besides 19000 Scouts and irregulars. Against this, the Indian Army had in J&K only two infantry divisions, comprising twelve infantry brigades; a total of some 50 infantry battalions of the regular army and the Indian States Forces, plus 12 battalions of the J&K Militia (some with only two companies) and 2 battalions of the East Punjab Militia.

Even if the above statement of comparative strength is taken as approximately correct, it is clear that Indian forces were definitely outnumbered by the enemy in J&K, and only the superior valour and skill, and perhaps fire-power, together with the invaluable help from the tiny Air Force, enabled the Indian Army to maintain its superiority on the battlefields. There can be no doubt, however, that any major offensive required more Indian troops in J&K.

The position regarding further Indian reinforcements for J&K was none too comfortable. Infantry was the basic requirement in the mountainous terrain, and infantry units of the Indian Army were fairly fully occupied elsewhere. About the end of 1948, there were 127 infantry battalions of the Indian Army, including Parachute and Gorkha battalions and State Forces units serving with the Indian Army, but excluding Garrison battalions and companies. Of these 127, some fifty battalions were already in J&K. Twenty-nine battalions were in the East Punjab, guarding the vital sector of the Indo-Pakistan frontier. Nineteen battalions were stationed in the Hyderabad area, where the Razakars still posed a potential threat to law and order and the Military Governor required strong forces at hand to complete his task of pacifying the area. There were thus only twenty-nine battalions, available for internal security, to guard the thousands of kilometres of frontier, and to act as the general reserve.

By scraping the barrel, more forces could certainly be despatched to J&K. But this would have accentuated the supply problem, as the entire force in J&K had to be maintained by a single rail-head, and a single road. This road was long and weak, and had numerous narrow bridges with which few liberties could be taken.

While logistics put a definite limit to the size of the forces that India could maintain in J&K. Pakistan suffered from no such limitation. There were numerous roads from Pakistan bases to the J & K border, and from there the actual front-line was generally accessible by short tracks or roads. So there was no maintenance problem for whatever reinforcements Pakistan could send to her forces in J&K to block any Indian advance.

Indian forces, therefore, had to operate in J&K under a definite and severe handicap. The enemy could not be beaten decisively by local action within the boundaries of J&K. For decisive victory, it was necessary to bring Pakistan to battle on the broad plains of the Punjab itself; the battle

of J&K, in the last analysis, had to be fought and won at Lahore and Sialkot, as events brought home in 1965. So, if the whole of J&K had to be liberated from the enemy, a general war against Pakistan was necessary. There can be hardly any doubt that Pakistan could be decisively defeated in a general war in 1948-49, although both the Indian and the Pakistan armies were in the throes of partition and reorganization then." (pp.373-5). India secured the Valley, Jammu and Ladakh. In 1948-49, it could not afford "a general war".

**Reference to the United Nations Security Council**

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Given the military situation, a ceasefire was imperative. Had it not acted, Pakistan would have gone there first, citing India as a respondent. The issue first came up on December 8, 1947, at Lahore when Mountbatten and Nehru went there to meet Liaquat Ali Khan. They discussed a draft agreement. Liaquat Ali Khan agreed to a reference to the UN. Mountbatten began to persuade Nehru to agree to this. Discussions were resumed in New Delhi on December 21-22, 1947. For long, Nehru was "bitterly opposed" to a reference to the UN. He agreed to it by December 22. The draft was approved by Gandhi who deleted the option of independence. (S. Gopal; *Nehru*, Vol.2, p.22).

In view of later criticism, it is important to note how and why things went wrong. "I (Mountbatten) informed him (Nehru) of my view that one of the main reasons why India's case had gone so badly at the Security Council was because the Indian delegation was completely outclassed by the Pakistan delegation. Not only was Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar completely the wrong type to send, not being a good social mixer and having a harsh, inaudible voice; but also there was nobody to compare with Mr. Mohammed Ali for doing background work behind the scenes. I told Pandit Nehru that my choice of the delegation would have been Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar as leader, with Mr. H.M. Patel and possibly General Bucher. I suggested that, if it was intended to continue discussions at Lake Success after an adjournment, this team, rather than the present one should be sent. Pandit Nehru said that he would think this suggestion over."

(Contd.on page 4)