By – MC Meetei
This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical ramifications of India’s missile strike on Pakistan on 7 May 2025, carried out in response to the Pahalgam attack. It examines the potential for escalation into full-scale war and explores the strategic risks of regional spillover, particularly the possibility of Bangladesh and China exploiting the Siliguri Corridor to sever Northeast India. Grounded in contemporary developments, historical context, and regional power dynamics, the piece offers an in-depth perspective for readers seeking to understand the evolving security landscape of South Asia.
On 7 May 2025, India conducted missile strikes into Pakistan, codenamed Operation Sindoor, targeting what it described as “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. This action was a direct response to the Pahalgam attack on 22 April 2025, attributed to The Resistance Front, which killed at least 26 civilians, mostly Hindu tourists, in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. India accused Pakistan of supporting the attackers, a charge Pakistan denied, escalating tensions in the long-standing Kashmir conflict, ongoing since 1947 and fueling multiple wars and skirmishes.
Pakistan reported that the strikes resulted in the deaths of at least nine civilians, including a child, and injured 38 others, with one location hit being the Bilal mosque in Muzaffarabad, as evidenced by photos published by Reuters. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called the strikes an “act of war” and vowed to respond, while India’s military declared “Justice is Served” on X. The international community, including Moody’s, warned of economic costs, with world powers calling for calm amid fears of confrontation.
Strategic assessments suggest the risk of escalation to a full-scale war is low, primarily due to the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, both possessing nuclear arsenals since the 1990s. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) has historically acted as a deterrent, as seen in past conflicts like the 1999 Kargil War and the 2019 Balakot airstrike, where both nations engaged in limited military actions but avoided all-out war.
Both nations’ nuclear capabilities make a full-scale war catastrophic, with Pakistan’s “first-use” policy and India’s “no-first-use” stance creating a delicate balance. Historical restraint, such as during the 2001-2002 standoff, suggests both sides are aware of the stakes.
Major Powers like the United States, China, and Russia have a vested interest in preventing escalation, likely exerting diplomatic pressure. The UN and other bodies have historically called for de-escalation, as seen in recent statements following the strikes.
A full-scale war would be economically devastating, diverting resources from development. Both nations face economic challenges, with Pakistan under IMF scrutiny and India managing post-COVID recovery, making war an unattractive option.
In India, the government faces pressure to respond strongly to the Pahalgam attack, but public opinion may turn against prolonged conflict. In Pakistan, hardliners may push for retaliation, but economic instability could limit military options. Both nations’ domestic politics suggest a preference for limited actions
While both have significant forces, a full-scale war would require sustained mobilisation, potentially stretching resources thin, especially with India’s focus on other borders like China and Pakistan’s internal security challenges.
However, the evidence leans toward limited military exchanges rather than a full-scale war, given historical patterns. Pakistan’s response, potentially involving retaliatory strikes as seen on 7 May 2025, could heighten tensions, but both nations are likely to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold.
On one hand, the possibility of Bangladesh and China’s involvement, particularly in separating Northeast India by breaking the Chicken Neck at Siliguri, seems highly unlikely based on current strategic dynamics. Bangladesh, with strong economic ties to India, relies on trade and transit routes through India, such as the Bangladesh-India Friendship Pipeline and shared river management agreements. It lacks the military capability for such an operation and has historically maintained neutrality in India-Pakistan conflicts. Research suggests Bangladesh’s interest lies in stability, not escalation, given its economic dependence. It seems likely that Bangladesh will avoid involvement, focusing on domestic development and regional cooperation.
China has a strategic partnership with Pakistan, supporting projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and has territorial disputes with India, particularly over Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin. However, direct military intervention to break the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip connecting Northeast India to the rest of the country, would be a major escalation. China’s economic interests in India, including trade worth over $100 billion annually, and its focus on global stability suggest it would avoid such action. The evidence leans toward China supporting Pakistan diplomatically or providing military aid, but not launching a direct attack on Indian territory.
Separating Northeast India would require not just military action but also political and logistical efforts, such as controlling the Siliguri Corridor, which is heavily militarised and strategically vital. Such an operation would provoke a strong Indian response and likely involve other regional powers, making it improbable. Historical tensions, like the 1962 Sino-Indian War, show China’s preference for limited engagements, not broad territorial incursions. While China may exploit the situation to pressure India on other fronts, such as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), direct involvement in the India-Pakistan conflict to target Northeast India is not currently indicated. Bangladesh’s involvement is even less likely, given its limited military capacity and economic ties with India.
The current escalation could lead to increased regional instability, affecting trade, security, and diplomatic relations. The Kashmir conflict, one of the most militarised regions globally, could see further skirmishes, potentially involving proxy groups supported by Pakistan, as seen in past insurgencies. However, the evidence leans toward limited military actions rather than a full-scale war, given the nuclear deterrent and international pressure.
The Siliguri Corridor’s vulnerability remains a concern, but breaking it would require significant escalation, which is not supported by current actions. Asymmetric warfare, such as supporting insurgent groups in Northeast India, is a possibility, but this is distinct from direct military intervention by Bangladesh or China.
While India’s missile attack on 7 May 2025 represents a significant escalation, research suggests it is unlikely to lead to a full-scale war due to nuclear deterrence, international pressure, and economic costs. The involvement of Bangladesh and China in separating Northeast India is highly improbable, given their strategic interests and capabilities. However, the situation remains fluid, and any further escalation could change the dynamics, necessitating diplomatic efforts to prevent broader conflict.
(Views are writer’s own. The writer is a Coordinator of Manipur International Youth Centre – MIYC. He can be reached at mcbm17@gmail.com)