The recent establishment of an Anti-Extortion Cell by the Chief Secretary of Manipur has sparked significant debate over its necessity and effectiveness. While the government presents this initiative as a proactive measure to tackle extortion, the creation of such a cell raises important questions: why is there a need for a new body when law enforcement agencies like the police, paramilitary forces, and intelligence units already exist? Does this move imply that these agencies have failed to control the worsening law and order situation in the state? More importantly, can this cell address the deeply rooted issue of extortion, especially in the wake of the ethnic conflict that began on May 3, 2023?
Manipur has long been plagued by extortion, with armed groups systematically targeting businesses, government employees, and the general public. However, the problem has escalated since the conflict, with reports suggesting that armed Kuki militants under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement are collecting over ¹ 10 crores per month through extortion activities, particularly along the national highways. This financial drain on local businesses and transporters weakens the state’s economy and strengthens the grip of these militant groups, allowing them to continue their operations largely unchallenged. Given this context, the formation of the Anti-Extortion Cell raises doubts about whether it is a symbolic gesture or a genuine solution. If law enforcement agencies were functioning effectively, the creation of this new cell might not have been necessary. The very establishment of the cell suggests that the government acknowledges the failure of existing mechanisms to control extortion and maintain law and order.
One of the significant challenges in tackling extortion is that victims are often too afraid to come forward. The fear of retaliation is a powerful deterrent. Those who receive extortion threats risk not only their own lives but also the safety of their families. In Manipur, where armed groups have a strong presence and often operate with impunity, it is hard for victims to have any confidence that the authorities will provide sufficient protection if they decide to report the threat. The absence of a robust witness protection system means that the Anti-Extortion Cell could struggle to achieve its goals, as victims may be unwilling to take the risk of speaking out. Given that powerful militant groups are involved in extortion, it is understandable why civilians may choose to comply with extortion demands rather than face the consequences of defying them. Without addressing this issue of fear and providing real protection to those who come forward, the Anti-Extortion Cell may find it difficult to make a meaningful impact.
Highway extortion is one of the most visible and widespread forms of extortion in the state, where armed groups collect money from transporters and travelers along national highways. The problem has only worsened since the onset of the crisis, putting additional strain on the local economy. The question arises: will the Anti-Extortion Cell be able to address this pressing issue effectively? If extortion on the highways continues without significant intervention, the new cell will struggle to tackle the larger problem of extortion in the state. To truly make a difference, the government must focus on a complete crackdown on highway extortion, as this is one of the primary revenue streams for the militant groups involved. Without tackling this root cause of extortion, the creation of an Anti-Extortion Cell will likely have little impact.
The government must understand that simply creating new agencies or departments will not solve the problem. A more comprehensive approach is needed, one that involves strong action to dismantle extortion networks and curb the power of militant groups. If the SoO agreement continues unofficially to protect the very groups accused of extortion, the government’s efforts to address this issue will remain ineffective. For any meaningful change to occur, the SoO framework must be revisited, and security forces must be deployed to eliminate extortion points, especially along highways. Additionally, a robust witness protection program must be established to encourage victims to report threats without fear of retaliation.
If the government is serious about addressing extortion, it needs to go beyond creating new bureaucratic structures and take decisive action. Only through strong enforcement, systematic crackdowns on extortionists, and the dismantling of illegal networks can the government restore law and order in Manipur. Without such measures, the Anti-Extortion Cell risks becoming another ineffective body that fails to tackle the root causes of the problem.