A step towards chaos — Why extending SoO could deepen the Manipur Crisis

In recent weeks, a flurry of closed-door meetings between representatives of Kuki Suspension of Operation (SoO) groups and officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has stirred fresh anxiety in the already fragile socio-political landscape of Manipur. Though official confirmation remains elusive, these interactions suggest that the Government of India may be considering extending the SoO arrangement with Kuki militant groups. If this extension materialises, it will not only embolden a heavily armed faction that has been at the centre of the ongoing ethnic conflict but also push Manipur deeper into disarray.
The SoO agreement, originally signed in 2008, was conceived as a temporary measure to bring Kuki militant groups into the political mainstream. It allowed the cadres to be housed in designated camps with a monthly stipend, arms locked away under official supervision. The idea was that peace would prevail and political dialogue would replace the gun. That dream never materialised. Instead, the SoO camps became breeding grounds for new demands, parallel administrations, and increasing assertions of territorial identity.
The recent ethnic strife between the Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities has turned Manipur into a fractured and bleeding state. Over 200 lives have been lost, tens of thousands displaced, and trust between communities lies shattered. In such a volatile scenario, the Centre’s willingness to entertain SoO groups for further negotiation—and perhaps even renew the arrangement—is baffling, if not reckless.
Extending the SoO at this point in time can be seen as a reward for lawlessness. Many of the SoO groups have been accused of active involvement in the ongoing conflict, particularly in Churachandpur, Kangpokpi, and Tengnoupal districts. Local sources, videos, and testimonies indicate that these groups were far from neutral during the violence. Even the Manipur Government had, in March 2023, withdrawn the SoO agreement with two prominent Kuki groups, citing breach of ground rules. If the Centre overrides this decision without a credible review mechanism, it risks undermining the state’s authority and legitimacy.
From a ground-level perspective, extending the SoO sends a dangerous message to communities who bore the brunt of the violence — that the rule of law is negotiable, and that political expediency trumps justice. The Meitei community, which views the conflict as a result of demographic aggression and armed provocation, will interpret any such extension as a betrayal. It could lead to widespread protests, erosion of public faith in the Union Government, and possible reprisals from non-Kuki groups. The ethnic fault lines will only deepen.
Moreover, the question arises—what exactly has the SoO achieved? Fifteen years of the truce have not brought about political reconciliation or disarmament. Instead, these groups have strengthened their grip over hill territories, consolidated their influence over local governance, and built an elaborate cross-border network with Myanmar. If anything, extending the SoO would further embolden their demand for a separate administration, already seen in the “Kukiland Territorial Council” demand — a euphemism for eventual secession.
The pessimistic but realistic view is that Manipur is inching closer to permanent ethnic partition. Extending the SoO will only accelerate this process by institutionalising militant influence over administration and civic life in the hills. The presence of a heavily armed group with ambiguous loyalties and a clear ethno-political agenda cannot be the foundation of a peaceful state.
If peace is indeed the goal, the Government of India must reconsider this strategy. Instead of offering extensions and appeasement, it should push for disbanding militant camps, restoring law and order, and launching an inclusive peace dialogue that includes all stakeholders — not just those with guns. Anything less would be a dangerous compromise with Manipur’s future.